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Abstract 
A high number of Palestinian workers used to work in Israel for decades. These people are 
mostly employed in low-skilled jobs in Israeli sectors which are highly dependent on foreign 
labour, namely agriculture and construction. With the beginning of the second Intifada in 
2000, border restrictions increased severely due to security concerns, limiting employment 
possibilities for Palestinians and leaving Palestine with severe unemployment and loss of 
income. Israeli employers have substituted Palestinian workers with an increasing number of 
foreign workers, mostly from Asia. Growing unemployment among Israeli unskilled workers 
caused Israel to impose quotas on the employment of foreigners. The purpose of this paper is 
to estimate the effects for both economies from lifting movement and access restrictions 
between Israel and the West Bank. The macro-economic effects of the Israeli labour policy 
are important to determine the absorptive capacity of the Israeli labour market. Therefore, we 
use an extended version of the single country CGE model STAGE (McDonald, 2009), 
adapted to a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Israel for the year 2004 (Siddig et al., 2011) 
to simulate the effects of different Israeli labour policy regimes.   3
1   Introduction 
Israeli and Palestinian labour markets were strongly integrated for decades. Palestinian 
workers commute to Israel on a day-to-day basis where they are usually employed at 
considerably higher wages than at home. In Israel, the agricultural and construction sectors 
are particularly highly dependent on the availability of cheap foreign labour. However, 
political relations between Israel and the Palestinian Territories remain tense. The situation 
fluctuates between periods of high tensions and somewhat more stability. The first election of 
the Palestinian Authority in 1995 took place when the peace process was ongoing and borders 
were open. In 1999 Israel was the biggest employer of Palestinian workers, with 23% of the 
employed Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements (PCBS, 2010). However, the 
situation suddenly changed with the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Palestinian uprising, 
in the last month of 2000. Accordingly, a partial closure of the Israeli-Palestinian border for 
goods and people was imposed which varies overtime in its degree of restrictiveness. As a 
result, only 8% of Palestinian employees were still working in Israel and the settlements in 
2004, leading to severe unemployment and loss of income in Palestine (PCBS, 2010). Until 
recently, crossing the border is subject to serious restrictions. Israeli employers have 
substituted Palestinian cross-border workers with an increasing number of foreign workers, 
mostly from Asia. A growing unemployment rate among Israeli low and unskilled workers 
caused Israel to impose quotas on the employment of foreign workers, which are said to 
crowd out Israeli workers. 
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to estimate the potential benefits which 
would accrue to both economies from lifting labour movement restrictions between Israel and 
the West Bank. The macroeconomic effects of the Israeli labour policy are crucial to 
determine the absorptive capacity of the Israeli labour market. Therefore, the study relies on 
an extended version of the CGE model STAGE (McDonald, 2009) together with a detailed 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Israel (Siddig et al., 2011). 
The Palestinian Territories consist of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These two regions 
have de facto little economic interactions, face different economic and social development, 
are ruled by different parties, and experience different treatment from Israel. Regarding the 
labour market, the regions show significant differences. While unemployment in the West 
Bank slightly decreased from 28.2% in 2002 to 17.8% in 2009, it remained high at 38.6% in 
2009 in the Gaza Strip (see Figure 1; PCBS, 2010). Furthermore, while there are no cross-  4
border workers from Gaza working in Israel anymore, about 14.0% of West Bank workers are 
still working in Israel (PCBS, 2010). As the political situation between the governments of the 
Gaza Strip and Israel remain tense, the blockade of the Gaza Strip is unlikely to be lifted soon. 
Furthermore, the economic interdependence of the two Palestinian regions is weak, 
particularly with respect to the labour market: less than 1.0% of West Bank workers have 
been employed in Gaza since 1995 and vice versa. Accordingly, this paper focuses only on 
the labour markets of the West Bank and Israel. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Israeli and Palestinian labour markets with a special 
focus on foreign labour in Israel. Chapter 3 explains the single country CGE model used in 
this study and describes its underlying database, namely the Israeli SAM for the year 2004. 
Moreover, this chapter covers the adjustments that are incorporated in the model which 
capture the intended simulations of labour movements across borders between the West Bank 
and Israel. Chapter 4 introduces simulated scenarios and subsequently presents and discusses 
the results of the analysis. In the last chapter, conclusions are drawn and potential policy 
implications are discussed. 
2  Labour markets in the West Bank and Israel 
2.1  The West Bank labour market  
Economic growth in the West Bank in recent years led to positive trends in the labour market, 
boosting employment and reducing unemployment. The West Bank labour force is fast 
growing: during the last 15 years the labour force nearly doubled from 358 thousand to 643 
thousand persons in 2009 (PCBS, 2010). The labour force participation rate is increasing too, 
but it stays at a relatively low level of 43.8% in 2009. This is mainly because of the low 
participation rate of women of 17.4%. In the Gaza Strip, the labour force participation rate is 
considerably lower at 37.6% in 2009. As a result of high economic growth after the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1995, unemployment strongly declined in the 
late 1990s (Figure 1). This positive development came to a sudden stop with the outbreak of 
the second Intifada in 2000, resulting in the closure of the Israeli-Palestinian border as well as 
the establishment of movement obstacles, such as checkpoints and road barriers within the 
Palestinian Territories. This led to a strong contraction of the Palestinian economy, which 
caused high unemployment.    5
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However, restrictions on access to the Israeli labour market have been the major source of 
unemployment in the West Bank during this period, since a large portion of the unemployed 
were previously working in Israel and the settlements (PCBS, 2005). On the eve of the 
Intifada in 1999, 26% of total West Bank workers were employed in Israel and the settlements, 
but this rate declined to 13% by 2002 (PCBS, 2010). Since 2002, this number has slightly 
increased again: in 2009, 14% were working in Israel and the settlements. Due to the high 
growth of the labour force, even this slight increase implies significant effects in the West 
Bank. A report by the Palestinian Ministry of Finance states that the number of Palestinians 
employed in Israel increased by 20% from 2007 to 2008, which led to a significant increase in 
national income and demand (Palestinian Ministry of Finance, 2009).  
Irrespective of their skill level, Palestinians are mainly employed in unskilled or low skilled 
jobs in Israel, predominantly in agriculture and construction. Nevertheless, the wages 
Palestinians can receive in Israel are at least 60% higher than the average wage in the West 
Bank (Bank of Israel, 2010a; PCBS, 2010). Compared to neighbouring countries, the wage 
level in the West Bank is relatively high (Aix-Group, 2007), which may be mainly due to the   6
possibility of employment in Israel, which raises the reservation wage (Bulmer, 2003). The 
reservation wage is the wage below which people would prefer waiting to get a job in Israel 
rather than working in the West Bank. 
2.2  The Israeli labour market 
During the second Intifada, the Israeli economy struggled with security and political 
uncertainty which resulted in stagnating domestic demand. Unemployment rates increased 
and peaked in 2003 at 10.6%. However, since 2003 the Israeli economy is fast growing, with 
increasing employment rates and wages. In 2006 the Bank of Israel announced a situation of 
full employment in Israel with the lowest unemployment rate since two decades of 6.1% and 
the highest level of labour force participation in history of 56.5%. (Bank of Israel, 2010a). 
Nevertheless, the unemployment rate began to slightly increase in 2009. Industries that 
intensively employ low skilled labour were main contributors to this increase in 
unemployment. Increasing unemployment of unskilled labour has been observed for several 
years. 
2.3  Palestinian cross border workers and foreign workers in Israel 
Israeli low and unskilled workers have to compete for jobs with foreign and Palestinian 
workers who are willing to work for lower wages. In Israel there is a minimum wage imposed 
and Israelis usually are not willing to work below that minimum wage (OECD, 2010). Weak 
enforcement of the minimum wage law makes it possible to employ foreign and Palestinian 
workers below that minimum wage (Bank of Israel, 2010b; OECD, 2010). The wage which 
Palestinians can receive in Israel differs by source (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Different reporting on wages for Palestinian workers in Israel, 2005 
Minimum wage in 
Israel 
Wages according to 
OECD publications
a 
Wages according to 
PCBS and Bank of 
Israel publications 
Average wage in 
West Bank (WB) 
(PCBS) 
     20 NIS/hour
d     18 NIS/hour
 a        16 NIS/hour 
d        9 NIS/hour 
d 
160 NIS/day  144 NIS/day 
d  127 NIS/day  74 NIS/day 
   3335 NIS/month  -
       2772 NIS/month 
b     1739 NIS/month 
c 
a Association of Contractors and Builders in Israel (2009) as cited in OECD (2010c).
b calculated with 22 days. 
c 
calculated with 23.6 days in WB.
d calculated with 8 working hours per day. 
Sources: OECD (2010c), PCBS (2011), Bank of Israel (2010a). 
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The wages for 2005 range from 127 NIS per day published by the Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics up to the level of the minimum wage of 160 NIS per day. Even when calculating 
with the lowest wage rate, this wage rate is 70% higher than the wage Palestinian workers 
would earn on average in the West Bank. If the minimum wage were applied to Palestinian 
workers, the wages they would receive in Israel would be more than double wages in the 
West Bank. On the other hand, the wage rate foreigners (non-Palestinians) receive is on 
average higher than that for Palestinians (OECD, 2010c). Moreover, Palestinian workers are 
subject to lower social contributions and fees than foreign workers, but employers in Israel 
pay for transportation costs of Palestinian workers.  
As shown in Figure 2, high numbers of Palestinians used to work in Israel for decades. The 
number decreased with intensifying tensions in the early 1990s, but recovered after the first 
election of the Palestinian Authority in 1995. The steep decline that begins in 2000 marks the 
outbreak of the second Intifada in which the number of workers coming from the Gaza Strip 
fully ceased. Since 2003 there is a slight increase, but the number of Palestinian workers 
barely reaches the low level in 1995. 




















Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Israel (2011) 
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There are three Israeli sectors which are highly dependent on non-Israeli workers, namely 
agriculture, construction, and homecare. In 2008, 30% of all employees in construction and 
37% of all employees in agriculture were non-Israeli (Bank of Israel, 2009). Non-Israelis are 
employed in these sectors partly because their wages are low and partly because employers 
cannot find Israelis who are willing to work in these jobs.  
Since 1993 the labour flow of Palestinians to Israel became irregular due to gradually 
increasing access restrictions. Reasons for the increased restrictions were security concerns, 
not economic ones. Changing security procedures increased uncertainty of whether the 
workers would be able to reach their workplace, even for those holding permits. This situation 
affected both employers and employees negatively (Aix-Group, 2007). 
The increased access restrictions led employers to successfully lobby for workers from abroad. 
Since 1990 workers from abroad are allowed to work in Israel. These are mainly Asian 
workers who receive working permits which they have to renew every three months. During 
the first 10 years, the number of foreign workers in Israel increased strongly and continued to 
increase during the second Intifada. At the same time, the number of issued permits remained 
almost constant since 1995 with approximately 60 thousand permits released annually (Bank 
of Israel, 2008; OECD, 2010) and with quotas on foreign labour in agriculture and 
construction. The increasing number of foreigners which can be observed is therefore mainly 
caused by illegal workers (people who stay in Israel after their working permit ended). The 
decline of foreign workers in 2003 was caused by  a period of stricter enforcement of return as 
well as an economic recession in the Israeli economy. In recent years the number of foreign 
workers in Israel has been rising again. 
3  Analytical Framework and Data 
3.1  Main features of the STAGE model 
This study uses the single country Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model STAGE 
(McDonald, 2009). In the STAGE model, production technologies can be specified as nested 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), which is the main feature for the purpose of this 
study. STAGE is calibrated using an Israeli Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the year 
2004.   9
3.2  Modelling of the labour market 
Domestic production of the model is extended to use a five-level production process. Each 
level involves CES or Leontief aggregations of primary or aggregated inputs to produce 
aggregates. Using CES technology allows for the assumption of imperfect substitution in 
factor demand between specific factor groups. The optimal combination of primary inputs is 
determined by relative factor prices and the substitutability determined by the specific CES 
elasticities. In the first level of the production nesting, aggregate intermediate input and 
aggregate value added are combined to form domestic output in fixed shares. Aggregate 
intermediate input is a Leontief aggregation of intermediate inputs, while aggregate value 
added is a combination of primary inputs using CES technologies. The inputs forming 
aggregate value added are capital, land, and aggregate labour, with the substitution elasticity 
σ22 determining the substitution possibilities among them (Figure 3). 






















Source: own compilation. 
 
Aggregate labour differentiates in the third level between unskilled and skilled labour. In the 
fourth level, first, skilled labour is composed of Jewish and Arab (and others) Israeli skilled   10
labour groups, which are imperfect substitutes. This is because there is broad recognition that 
in Israel ethnicity affects employment, which is partly due to service in the Israeli Defence 
Forces (IDF) (OECD, 2010a, b). While Jewish Israelis (with the exemption of the religious 
Haredim) serve for two to three years in the army, Arabs generally do not serve in the army. 
Accordingly, those who did serve in the IDF are supported with privileges in the labour 
market. This discriminates against those who did not serve. Nevertheless, it is common for 
countries to reward people who served in the army. In Israel, however, some minority groups 
do not serve and thus such supporting practices affect one population group more than the 
other (OECD, 2010c). Second, unskilled labour is composed of Israeli unskilled labour 
groups and non-Israelis. Non-Israelis mostly work in unskilled jobs in Israel, regardless of 
their skill-level (PCBS, 2005). 
The fifth level consists of the unskilled branch of the labour nest. The Israeli unskilled labour 
group is a composite of Jewish and Arab (and others) labour groups. Non-Israelis are 
distinguished between Palestinians and workers from the rest of the world. 
3.3  The database 
3.3.1  The Israeli SAM 
The Israeli 2004 SAM used in this study is compiled by the Agricultural and Food Policy 
Group at the University of Hohenheim, documented in Siddig et al. (2011), and characterised 
by several distinctive features. First, the SAM differentiates between activities and 
commodities. Second, the SAM provides detailed data on trade and transportation margins. 
Third, the government account is separated from the detailed tax account. Fourth, the SAM 
provides detailed data on factors of production and households as it distinguishes between 10 
household groups. Furthermore, labour is disaggregated into 36 subaccounts that differ 
according to profession and ethnicity. The SAM contains data on seven skilled professions in 
different occupations in addition to unskilled labour groups. In terms of ethnic differentiation, 
it distinguishes between Jews and non-Jews, which include female and male labour groups. 
Additionally, there are four non-Israeli labour groups incorporated in the SAM, representing 
legal and illegal Palestinian cross-border workers and foreign workers from the rest of the 
world. 
The sources of the data used to compile the SAM include the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics (ICBS), the Central Bank of Israel (BOI), and the Israeli Tax Authority (ITA). In 
addition, data from sources outside of Israel are used to fill-in some gaps from the domestic   11
reports. External sources include the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. 
3.3.2  Additional databases 
There are two additional data sets used for this analysis. The first is a matrix of quantities of 
primary inputs, which is needed because the SAM contains information on values only. 
Finally, a series of elasticity values completes the database, including elasticities of 
substitution of imports and exports related to domestic commodities, elasticities of 
substitution for the CES functions in the production nest, income elasticities of demand as 
well as Frisch parameters for each household group for the specification of a CES demand 
system. 
4  Policy scenarios and results 
4.1  Policy scenarios 
Two scenarios are run to estimate the effects of different labour policy regimes with regard to 
Palestinian workers in Israel.  
For both scenarios the labour market closures are modelled as follows: The Israeli labour 
market for skilled and unskilled labour has full employment and adjusts by variation of the 
wage rate, thus assuming that the minimum wage law is not enforced. The scenarios are 
defined by varying factor supply for the respective non-Israeli labour groups. 
4.1.1  Base Scenario 
First, a base scenario is run, replicating the 2004 Social Accounting Matrix and thus reflecting 
a restrictive border policy against Palestinians. Furthermore, quotas on foreign workers are in 
place, hence only a limited number of foreigners and Palestinians are allowed to work in 
Israel. Besides workers with an official permit, workers from Palestine and the rest of the 
world who are working illegally in Israel are taken into account. 
4.1.2  Pre-Intifada scenario: increasing the number of Palestinian workers to the pre-
Intifada level 
Second, a scenario is run in which the border for Palestinians to Israel is opened and the 
number of Palestinians working in Israel is increased to meet the pre-Intifada level. Thus, the 
number of Palestinian cross-border workers is increased from 50 thousand in the base   12
scenario to 114 thousand in this scenario. With respect to the Palestinian labour supply, it is 
assumed that it is elastic, which implies that there are additional workers from the West Bank 
available who are willing to work for the same wage rate or a lower wage rate than they can 
receive in Israel under the base scenario. The high unemployment rate in the West Bank and 
the high gap between the wages Palestinians can receive in Israel and the wages they receive 
in the West Bank support this assumption. 
4.2  Results 
This section presents and analyses changes under the pre-Intifada scenario as percentage 
deviations from the base scenario. Effects on the Israeli economy are presented first. 
Afterwards, potential effects on the Palestinian economy are discussed 
4.2.1  Effects on the Israeli economy 
The increased Palestinian labour supply in Israel – from 50 thousand to the pre-Intifada level 
of 114 thousand – changes the relative availability of factors and thus directly affects returns 
to factors. As displayed in Table 2, the average wage rate of labour decreases while capital 
and land become relatively scarce, resulting in increasing returns. The effect is particularly 
strong for land because it is used in agricultural sectors which mainly employ unskilled labour 
and are therefore strongly affected by the change in Palestinian labour supply (Table 4). 
Table 2: Effects of the pre-Intifada scenario on the wage rates of different factor groups 




Skilled labour  0.168 
Unskilled labour  -3.486 
Israeli unskilled labour  -2.547 
Non-Israeli unskilled labour  -5.050 
Palestinian labour  -16.856 
Foreign labour from the rest of the world  -4.178 
 
Palestinian labour is employed in unskilled jobs in Israel. The increase in quantity of 
unskilled labour makes skilled labour relatively scarce, causing wages for skilled labour to 
increase by 0.2% while wages of total unskilled labour decreases by 3.4%. Main contributors 
to decreasing wages for unskilled labour are non-Israelis who experience a decrease in wages   13
of 5.1%, but also wages of unskilled Israelis decrease by 2.5%. Finally, wages of Palestinian 
cross-border workers fall by 16.9%, while the wages of foreigners decrease by 4.2%. 
Table 3: Macroeconomic effects of the pre-Intifada scenario in Israel, selected variables 
Variables Change  in  % 
Gross domestic product (GDPVA)  0.322 
Exchange rate  0.053 





As shown in Table 3, the Israeli GDP grows by 0.3%. Palestinians use to work in Israel on a 
day to day basis, what implies that they do spend their income not in Israel but in the West 
Bank. Increased Palestinian labour use therefore increases workers’ remittances flowing from 
Israel to the West Bank. Thus, the exchange rate depreciates to absorb this reduction in the 
current account, which increases the competitiveness of exports. Producer prices in Israel 
decline slightly by 0.06%. Lower producer prices and higher income lead to increased import 
demand, despite the depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Table 4 presents sectoral effects on prices, domestic production, and exports as well as shares 
of unskilled labour in the total labour input per sector. Output prices are determined by the 
price of value added, prices for intermediate inputs, and export prices, while purchaser prices 
are determined by producer prices and import prices. Therefore purchaser prices deviate from 
output prices. Since Israel is a small country, world market prices are not affected by changes 
in the Israeli market. Thus, for wheat, for example, 74% of total Israeli demand for wheat is 
imported; hence the purchasing price is largely influenced by the world market price and 
changes only slightly compared to the strong decline in the output price. 
Regarding the impact on the different sectors of the economy, three groups of sectors can be 
distinguished. First, for sectors in which the share of unskilled labour in the total labour is 
high, lower wages for unskilled labour reduce input costs and result in a decrease in the 
composite price of output (PX). Agricultural sectors such as wheat, other crops (except 
cereals), milk, and vegetables-fruit production as well as construction are main employers of 
unskilled labour. Therefore, these sectors show a relatively high decrease in output prices 
(PX), but do not produce considerably more goods, expressed by a relatively low percentage 
increase of the quantity produced (QX). This is because the increase in domestic demand as   14
well as export demand for the goods of these sectors is relatively low (Table 4 (QE) and Table 
5 (QCD)). Domestic demand increases only slightly because demand for agricultural goods as 
well as construction is assumed to be inelastic with respect to prices and income. Exemptions 
are the other crops sector and to a smaller extent the wheat producing sector with exports 
increasing by 1.8% and 1%, respectively. Therefore, their production also considerably 
increases compared to the other agricultural sectors and the construction sector. 
Table 4: Effects of the pre-Intifada scenario on production and unskilled labour input, 
selected sectors 
  Change in %  Share of unskilled labour in total 























Wheat  -0.219    -0.027 0.520  1.080 10.3 3.4 24.0 37.7
Other crops  -0.244   -0.259 1.182  1.782 9.9 3.8  27.1  40.7
Milk  -0.223    -0.229 0.217  0.776 10.0 2.8 19.5 32.3
Vegetables and fruits  -0.180   -0.225 0.282  0.752 9.9 3.8  27.1  40.7
Electronic equipment  -0.018   -0.023 1.382  1.496 7.1 2.7  0.6  10.3
Manufactures  (nec.)  -0.002   -0.035 2.630  2.689 6.9 1.9 0.4 9.2
Construction  -0.392    -0.398 0.262  0.985 4.4 9.2 26.7 40.3
Communication 0.097    0.053 0.347  0.259 4.1 0.6  0  4.7
Public services  0.041   0.042 0.210  0.232 4.9 0.6  3.7  9.2
 
 
Second, electronic equipment and manufactures (not else classified, nec.) represent the 
industrial sector. The share of unskilled labour in these sectors is around ten percent or less. 
On the one hand, lower input costs decrease the price of output (PX); however, the price 
decreases by a much smaller amount compared to that in the agricultural and construction 
sectors. On the other hand, the second group of sectors can realise relative high production 
increases of 1.4% and 2.6%, respectively, in response to increasing consumption and export 
demand. 
The third group of sectors consists mostly of service sectors and is represented by the 
communication and the public services sectors in Table 4. These sectors employ little 
unskilled and Palestinian labour. The selected sectors experience increased wages for skilled 
labour, resulting in rising input costs. At the same time, the quantity produced also increases, 
driven by higher domestic and export demand. The increase in the domestic demand in Israel 
is driven by the higher income of Israeli households.   15
 
Table 5: Effects of the pre-Intifada scenario on household welfare 

























hj1 0.070 0.359 0.054 0.079 0.078 0.161  0.205 0.125 0.135 0.183 0.201 
hj2 0.024 0.501 0.039 0.062 0.062 0.150  0.191 0.120 0.124 0.167 0.185 
hj3 0.064 1.291 0.042 0.083 0.082 0.268  0.340 0.190 0.230 0.320 0.342 
hj4 0.123 2.114 0.026 0.077 0.077 0.337  0.426 0.238 0.290 0.403 0.430 
hj5 0.186 4.404 0.023 0.090 0.090 0.526  0.671 0.442 0.426 0.567 0.639 
hao1 0.000 0.094 0.035 0.050 0.050 0.086  0.111 0.087 0.064 0.080 0.098 
hao2 -0.018 0.105 0.031 0.049 0.049 0.107  0.138 0.099 0.084 0.108 0.126 
hao3 -0.002 0.174 0.038 0.073 0.073 0.230  0.292 0.171 0.194 0.267 0.290 
hao4 0.023 0.112 0.020 0.058 0.058 0.235  0.300 0.187 0.195 0.263 0.291 
hao5 0.095 0.125 0.021 0.079 0.078 0.434  0.556 0.396 0.339 0.440 0.512 
Israeli household groups: 
hj1  Jewish households in first income quintile 
hj2  Jewish households in second income quintile 
hj3  Jewish households in third income quintile 
hj4  Jewish households in fourth income quintile 
hj5  Jewish households in fifth income quintile 
hao1  Arabic and other households in first income quintile 
hao2  Arabic and other households in second income quintile 
hao3  Arabic and other households in third income quintile 
hao4  Arabic and other households in fourth income quintile 
Hao5  Arabic and other households in fifth income quintile   16
Regarding effects on different household groups (Table 5), incomes of Jewish household 
groups rise more than those of Arab and other non-Jewish (henceforth, Arab) ones, and those 
of high income quintiles rise more than those of low quintiles. This is due to the different 
ownership of factors. Compared to Jewish households, Arab households have a larger share in 
unskilled labour, which experiences a fall in wages. Moreover, compared to Arab households, 
Jewish households own more skilled labour. The lowest quintiles show a higher increase in 
income than the second and the third quintiles. This is because their income is composed of 
less unskilled labour and a higher share of transfers, which are increasing. Household income 
is not only composed of income from factors, but also contains transfers from government, 
enterprises, other households, and from the rest of the world. Transfer payments increase 
because government, enterprise, and aggregated household income increase, leading to 
increased transfers from these institutions. 
Despite the negative impact on the income of some household groups, the equivalent variation 
(EV) is positive for all household groups. The EV is the monetary amount which would have 
to be paid to the household groups for them to reach the same utility level as they had in the 
situation with the policy imposed without price or income changes. Hence, positive EVs 
imply that all household groups reach a higher utility level under the policy scenario. 
This is also reflected in the quantity of household consumption by commodity (QCD). While 
prices for some goods decrease and prices for other goods increase, the change in the quantity 
of household consumption is positive for all goods and household groups. While all 
households are positively affected, as indicated by the positive EV changes, households in 
higher income quintiles benefit relatively more compared to households in lower quintiles. 
Therefore, the income gap between poor and rich households widens. 
4.2.2  Effects on the West Bank economy 
Cross-border workers from the West Bank who work in Israel experience a substantial, 16.9%, 
fall in wages; however, the substantial increase in the number of workers results in an 
increase in the overall labour income of Palestinians working in Israel, from 1374.0 NIS 
million in the base scenario to 2524.4 NIS million in the pre-Intifada scenario (Table 6). 
Therefore, the West Bank economy as a whole benefits from this increase in income. In the 
pre-Intifada scenario, remittances of Palestinians working across the border in Israel account 
for 25.5% of the GDP for the West Bank in 2004. In relation to the West Bank’s GDP in 2010, 
16 355.8 NIS Million (in constant 2004 prices), remittances still account for 15.5% of the 
2010 GDP, indicating the relevance of worker remittances for the West Bank’s economy.   17
Thus, the simulated policy reduces unemployment in the West Bank by employing more 
Palestinian workers and simultaneously increases the West Bank’s income. It is expected that 
this increase would encourage domestic production and investment. 
Table 6: Palestinian workers remittances from Israel and West Bank GDP (2004) 
 Base  Scenario  Pre-Intifada  Scenario 
Workers remittances from 
Israel 
1374.0 NIS Million  2524.4 NIS Million 
West Bank GDP  Share of remittances in the West Bank GDP 
9899.1 NIS Million  13.8%  25.5% 
Source: PCBS, 2011
 
Large revenues from worker remittances can cause negative effects on the economy, resulting 
in an appreciation of the real exchange rate – a paradox known as Dutch disease. In this 
regard, less Palestinians employed in Israel could imply a chance for the Palestinian economy 
to enhance growth. Nevertheless, a study by Astrup and Dessus (2005) found that increased 
export competitiveness for the Palestinian territories was insufficient to compensate for losses 
in income after closure of the Israeli labour market, indicating that cross-border employment 
is an important contributor to the living standard in the Palestinian territories. 
4.2.3  Testing for the sensitivity of the results to the level of the substitution elasticities 
σ42 and σ52 
To build confidence in the results of the employed model and particularly in the substitution 
elasticities used in the labour market equations, several sensitivity analyses are run. These 
analyses show that two of the elasticities have an especially strong influence on the results. 
These elasticities are the substitution elasticity between Israeli and non-Israeli unskilled 
workers,  σ42, and the substitution elasticity between Palestinian and foreign workers, σ52 
(Figure 3). 
Increasing the substitution elasticity between Israeli and non-Israeli unskilled workers, σ42, 
increases negative effects on poor Israelis. Assuming the elasticity is 8 instead of 4 reduces 
the positive change in the quantity of goods consumed (QCD), while effects remain positive. 
On the other hand, when assuming an almost perfect substitutability between Israeli and non-
Israeli unskilled workers, which means setting the elasticity to 100, the change in the QCD 
becomes negative for poor Israeli households. The substitution elasticity between Israeli and 
non-Israeli unskilled workers is likely to vary with the political situation. It describes the   18
extent of the reluctance of employers to employ non-Israelis and, in particular, Palestinians. In 
case of strong conflicts, this reluctance is expected to be higher than in more peaceful 
situations.  
When increasing the substitution elasticity between Palestinian and foreign workers, σ52, from 
6 to either 12 or 100, the effects found in the labour market are stronger. One effect is that the 
wage of aggregated labour decreases. The main effect, however, is that the allocation of 
wages between Palestinians and foreigners changes. Palestinians wages drop less if σ52 is high 
and foreigners experience a higher drop in wages. Differences in the effects on Israeli 
households are not large. Moreover, effects on the macroeconomic level are very small, but 
positive when the elasticity is increased. 
5  Conclusions and outlook 
In this paper we examine the potential effects of a liberalised labour market policy in Israel 
with respect to cross-border workers from the West Bank. For this purpose we simulate a 
scenario which increases the number of Palestinians working in Israel from 50 thousand to the 
pre-Intifada level of more than 100 thousand. 
The results indicate that a liberalised labour market policy would be able to increase domestic 
production and enhance economic growth in Israel. A liberalised labour market policy would 
widen the income gap between poor and rich households by increasing the factor income of 
rich household groups and by even reducing the factor income to some poor household 
groups. However, the negative effect of decreasing factor income is smaller than positive 
effects accruing to all household groups from a decrease in prices and an increase in transfer 
income, resulting in welfare gains for all household groups in Israel. 
The West Bank economy would benefit from a liberalised labour market policy as labour 
income of Palestinians in Israel would strongly increase. Nevertheless, such an inflow of 
money in the West Bank from employment abroad could also have negative effects on the 
Palestinian economy. Previous studies have found a positive effect from the transfer of high 
labour income from Palestinian cross-border workers to the West Bank, but further research is 
needed to analyse the effects of such income transfers on the West Bank’s economy. We 
therefore envisage to endogenise the Palestinian labour supply in a first step and to combine 
the CGE model for Israel with a CGE model for the West Bank in a second step. We also plan 
to depict the Israeli minimum wage in the CGE model and to improve the empirical base of 
labour substitution elasticities applied.   19
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